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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment in favor of defendant.

Summary judgment presents only

questions of law reviewable for correctness.
P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996).

Mills

v.

Brody,

929

This issue was preserved for appeal

in Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment and CrossMotion for Summary Judgment. (R. 66-71)
2.

Whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's

cross-motion for summary judgment.

Summary judgment presents

only questions of law reviewable for correctness.
Brody,

929 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996).

Mills

v.

This issue was preserved

for appeal in Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 66-71)
3.

Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that the

statutes of limitation for enforcing both the Promissory Note and
the Deed of Trust set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-23 and 571-34 have not expired and that the Promissory Note and the Deed
of Trust remain enforceable.

This is a question of law

reviewable for correctness.

See, e.g., Horn v. Utah Dept.

Public

Safety,

962 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1998).

of

This issue was

preserved for appeal in Plaintiff's Response to Motion for

Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 6671)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee
- Foreclosure of trust deed - Limitation of actions. The
trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be made,
or an action to foreclose a trust deed as provided by law
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property shall be
commenced, within the period prescribed by law for the
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the
trust deed.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Within six years - Mesne profits
of real property - Instruments in writing. An action may be
brought within six years: (1) for the mesne profits of real
property; (2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability
founded upon an instrument in writing, except those
mentioned in Section 78-12-22.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a order of the Third Judicial

District Court of Salt Lake County.
II.

Statement of Facts
1.

Plaintiff is a co-owner of the real property located at

4490 Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 1 & 33)
2.

On or about August 26, 1986, plaintiff executed a

Promissory Note and Deed of Trust in favor of U.S. Thrift & Loan.
(R. 4-11)
3.

The Promissory Note and Deed of Trust were subsequently

assigned to defendant. (R. 12)

4.

The Promissory Note provides for monthly payments in the

amount of $1,320.92 commencing September 15, 1986. (R. 4)
5.

No payments have been made in accordance with the terms

of the Promissory Note since in or around August 1993. (R. 2 &
33)
6.

The Promissory Note authorizes acceleration of its

entire unpaid balance upon an event of default, including nonpayment of the monthly payments. (R. 6)
7.

On or about February 27, 1995, defendant recorded a

Notice of Default in which defendant exercised her option to
accelerate the entire unpaid balance of the Promissory Note. (R.
13-14)
8.

More than six years later, on November 21, 2001,

defendant recorded a second Notice of Default in connection with
her Promissory Note and Deed of Trust and on or about February
25, 2002, defendant's Substitute Trustee gave notice of a
Trustee's Sale of the property to be held April 10, 2002. (R. 15)
9.

On March 14, 2002, plaintiff filed his Complaint

commencing the case at bar in which he alleged the foregoing
facts and, based upon the expiration of the six-year statute of
limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated §§ 57-1-34 and 7812-23, prayed, inter alia, for the following relief:
1. for a declaration that the Promissory Note and Deed
of Trust at issue are unenforceable and do not constitute a

lien or encumbrance upon the subject real property; and
2. for an order quieting plaintiff's title to the
property in plaintiff's name free and clear of any claim by
defendant.
(R. 1-15)
10.

On or about May 20, 2002, defendant filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment. (R. 64-65) Plaintiff filed his Response to
Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
on or about June 3, 2002 (R. 66-71), and defendant filed her
Reply/Response memorandum on or about June 11, 2002. (R. 72-78)
11.

Apparently concluding that the six-year statute of

limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated §§ 57-1-34 and 7812-23 is not applicable to this case, on July 29, 2002 the
District Court issued its Order of Summary Judgment in which it
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, denied
plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, and dismissed this
case with prejudice. (R. 85-86)
12.

Plaintiff timely filed his Notice of Appeal on August

20, 2002. (R. 87-88)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As set forth above, on or about February 27, 1995, defendant
recorded a Notice of Default in which she exercised her option to
accelerate the entire unpaid balance of the Promissory Note at
issue in this action.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 57-1-34

and 78-12-23, defendant had six years in which to either conduct
a non-judicial trustee's sale of the property or commence an
action to judicially foreclose the Deed of Trust.

Because

defendant's cause of action accrued on February 27, 1995, when
she exercised her option to accelerate the entire unpaid balance
of the Promissory Note at issue, defendant was required to
conduct a trustee's sale on or before February 27, 2001.

Having

failed to do so, the statutes of limitation for enforcing both
the Promissory Note and the Deed of Trust as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-12-23 and 57-1-34 have expired and neither the
Promissory Note nor the Deed of Trust is enforceable.
ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in concluding that the statute of
limitations for enforcing the Promissory Note and the Deed
of Trust have not expired and that both instruments remain
enforceable.
On or about February 27, 1995, defendant recorded a Notice
of Default in which she exercised her option to accelerate the
entire unpaid balance of the Promissory Note at issue in this
action.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 57-1-34 and 78-12-23,

defendant had six years in which to either conduct a non-judicial
trustee's sale of the property or commence an action to
judicially foreclose the Deed of Trust.

Section 57-1-34 provides

as follows:
The trustee's sale of property under a deed of trust shall
be made, or an action to foreclose a trust deed as provided
by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property

shall be commenced, within the period prescribed by law for
the commencement of an action on the obligation secured by
the trust deed.
In the case at bar, the "period prescribed by law for the
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the trust:
deed" is set forth in section 78-12-23, U.C.A.:
An action may be brought within six years:
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon
an instrument in writing ...
Because defendant's cause of action accrued on February 27,
1995, when she exercised her option to accelerate the entire
unpaid balance of the Promissory Note at issue, see, e.g., 51 Am
Jur

2d,

p. 588 § 166 (the statute of limitations begins to run

upon the creditor's exercise of the option to accelerate the
maturity of the debt), defendant was required to conduct a
trustee's sale on or before February 27, 2001.

Having failed to

do so, the statutes of limitation for enforcing both the
Promissory Note and the Deed of Trust as set forth in Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-12-23 and 57-1-34 have expired and neither the
Promissory Note nor the Deed of Trust is enforceable.
Defendant, however, argues that she "commenced" a nonjudicial foreclosure by the recording of a Notice of Default in
February 1995 within the six-year period of limitations. (R. 44)
Defendant misreads § 57-1-34.

Section 57-1-34 recognizes and

provides the limitations period for both methods of foreclosing a
trust deed, non-judicial (see Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-28) and

judicial (see UCA § 78-37-1).

With respect to non-judicial

foreclosures, § 57-1-34 provides that "[t]he trustee's sale of
property under a deed of trust shall be made ... within [six
years of acceleration of the trust deed note]." (Emphasis added).
With respect to judicial foreclosures, § 57-1-34 provides that
"[a]n action to foreclose a trust deed as provided by law for the
foreclosure of mortgages on real property shall be commenced
[within six years of acceleration]." (Emphasis added).
Accordingly, fairly read,

§ 57-1-34 requires that a non-judicial

foreclosure sale must take place within six years of acceleration
and that an action for judicial foreclosure must be commenced
within six years of acceleration.

Defendant neither "made" a

non-judicial foreclosure sale nor "commenced" a judicial
foreclosure action within six-years of acceleration and her right
to do so is now time barred.
If the Court were to accept defendant's interpretation of
§ 57-1-34, the filing of her February 1995 Notice of Default
effectively tolled the statute of limitations forever.

Having

"commenced" her non-judicial foreclosure, there would be nothing
to prevent defendant from noticing up her foreclosure sale in ten
years, twenty years, or in the year 2050.

That is clearly an

absurd result unwarranted by the language of § 57-1-34.
Defendant also asserts that "the intervening contract
between the parties tolls the running of the statute." (R. 45) In

support of this assertion, defendant alleges that "[i]n December
of 1997, the Defendant and the Owners entered into the agreement
which specifically provides that the issue of the

A

bank payments'

would not be resolved until other matters set out in Part A of
the agreement were disposed of first." (R.45) According to
defendant, "[t]he agreement specifically tolls the running of the
statute until Part A has been completed..." (R. 45) Again,
defendant's argument is without merit.

In the first place,

defendant is not a party to the Settlement Agreement. (R.59-62)
Nor does the settlement agreement say anything about tolling any
statute of limitations, let alone "specifically" toll it as
defendant would have the Court believe.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests that
the trial court's Order of Summary Judgment be reversed and that
this action be remanded to the trial court with instructions for
the entry of summary jydgment in plaintiff's favor,
DATED t h i s
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DIVISION
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BAHMAN DADGARI,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 02-0902302
NILOOFAR BAKHTI,
JUDGE BURTON
Defendant.
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant's motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs cross-motion for
summary judgment having been presented to the court along with Defendant's request for oral
argument, and the court having reviewed the pleadings and materials supplied by the parties,
and find the following:
1. There is no substantial fact question which is in dispute.
2. This case is a clear case where summary judgment is appropriate.
3. Defendant's request for oral argument is denied.
4. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

5. Plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.
6. This case is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

day of July, 2002.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

[CHELL
ley for Plaintiff
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